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In psychological games, higher-order beliefs, emotions, and motives - in addition to actions - 
affect players’ payoffs. Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely accepted by 
your peers and “friends”. In particular, suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc 
not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not 
invite you. In all of these cases, it is conceivable that the intention behind the action will 
matter and hence will affect your payoffs. I model intentions in a dynamic psychological 
game under incomplete information. I find a complex social interaction in this game. In 
particular, a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of 
discouraging insincere invitations. This may lead one to erroneously infer that this player is 
eagerly waiting for an invitation, when indeed his behavior is driven more by strategic 
considerations than by an excessive desire for social acceptance. I discuss how being tolerated 
but not being truly accepted can explain the rejection of mutually beneficial trades, the choice 
of identity, social exclusion, marital divorce, and its implication for political correctness and 
affirmative action. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  In standard economics and game theory, only actions should affect payoffs. 
Intentions are irrelevant. It is the final outcome that matters not the process. But there are 
clearly situations where intentions affect payoffs. The same action might induce different 
payoffs depending on the intentions of the parties or players. This implies that beliefs 
about beliefs (i.e., intentions) affect players’ payoffs. Indeed, these are games in which a 
player’s emotions like surprise, joy, and disappointment affect her payoffs. As 
Geanakoplos et al. (1989, p. 61) observe “[a] player’s emotional reactions cannot in 
general be independent of his expectations and his interpretation of what he learns in the 
play of the game”. They refer to such games as psychological games and provide the first  
characterization of equilibria. As Kolpin (1992, p. 218) notes in these games “… no 
single utility function characterizes a player’s preferences over the physical outcome set.”  
Geanakoplos et al. (1989, p. 69) present the following example: 
“… a man is deciding whether or not to give a woman flowers. … The woman may be 
unhappy for either two reasons: she might expect flowers and not receive them, or she 
might conclude from his behavior that he is willing to disappoint her. Thus, even if she is 
not expecting flowers but believes that he thinks she is expecting flowers, she will be 
unhappy not to receive flowers, because this indicates his willingness to disappoint her.” 
 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1988) also analyze a related class of games.
 Consider the 
following example in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1988, p. 216): 
“Mr. A hates Mr. B for ‘wrongs’ B did to him. Assuming Mr. A can follow a strategy 
which will hurt B, A will choose such a strategy for the sake of revenge. However, the 
revenge will be sweeter if A knows that B anticipates it. That is to say, the same play of 
the game may result in a higher payoff for A if B knows that this indeed is going to be the 
play of the game.” 
 
Clearly, the above examples show that beliefs and intentions affect payoffs. Falk, 
Fehr, and Fischbacher (2000), Brandts and Sola (2001), Falk et al. (2003), McCabe et al.   2
(2003), and Offerman (2002) present experimental evidence which support the idea that 
intentions matter in reciprocal relationships. Indeed, intentions matter in other important 
ways. It is the basis for the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter and partly 
explains the attitudes of certain groups towards racial profiling. 
In a very important contribution, extension, and application of the theoretical 
work of Geanakoplos et al. (1989),
 Rabin (1993) modeled the idea that people reward 
actions which have kind intentions and punish actions which have unkind intentions.
1 
This has been recently extended in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006). Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000) have applied psychological 
game theory to study wage under-cutting. Also, Ruffle (1999) studies a psychological 
gift-giving game and Dufwenberg (2002) studies how feelings of guilt and beliefs affect 
the payoffs of spouses and sustain investments in marriage. In a related contribution, 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2005) theoretically and experimentally show how guilt 
aversion can cause people to fulfill their promises in partnerships. 
  The purpose of this note is to analyze a related class of social interactions. 
Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely accepted by your peers and 
“friends”. In particular, suppose you are invited to a party, movie, dinner, etc not because 
your company is desired but because the inviter would feel guilty if she did not invite 
you, or you got a job at an elite institution but you wouldn’t have been offered the job if 
you were not a minority, or someone gives you a present because they felt obliged to do 
so not because they really wanted to give you a present? Or a friend is expected to give 
                                                 
1 Note that Gilboa and Schmeidler (1988) differs from these papers in one key respect. Their main goal is 
to point out that common knowledge and “common sense” are inconsistent in games where beliefs or 
information about the outcome affect payoffs (see their proposition 2). Their work may be interpreted as 
drawing attention to the limitations of traditional game theory in analyzing psychological-type games.   3
you a phone call because you need her emotional support. If you have a caller ID and you 
think she is making the call reluctantly, will you answer the phone? If your boss, 
supervisor, or professor tells you to feel free to come talk to her anytime you encounter 
problems in your work, will you take her up on that offer, if you thought she was making 
the offer grudgingly? Does one’s enjoyment from sex depend on whether her partner’s 
intention is a long-term relationship or casual relationship? Will the answer affect the 
decision to accept or reject an invitation into a sexual relationship? In all of these cases, it 
is conceivable that the intention behind the action will matter and hence will affect your 
payoffs. The average reader may be able to relate to some of these situations from 
personal experience. These examples are common and interesting social interactions 
worthy of study. They are the basis of friendships and relationships at work, school, 
church, and in our daily lives. They determine who we choose to go to lunch with, play 
with, and in general socialize with. They determine the frequency and enjoyment of our 
social interactions. 
  It is important to note that I assume that there is already some kind of superficial, 
implicit, or lower-level relationship between the two parties. For example, they may work 
at the same place. The question is “will the parties take the relationship to the next level 
in a world where the intentions behind actions matter?” And since it takes two to tango, 
one party must have the option of inviting or not inviting the other party and the other 
party must have the option of accepting or rejecting the invitation. 
  To the best of my knowledge, this is the only paper, apart from Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2005), that examines a dynamic psychological game under incomplete 
information. However, my analysis is restricted to a specific albeit important context.   4
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) present a more general analysis of dynamic 
psychological games. But they do not examine the kind of social interaction that I focus 
on or the applications herein. The bulk of Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s (2005) analyses is 
restricted to dynamic psychological games with complete information. They briefly 
explain how their analyses and framework and be adapted to examine dynamic 
psychological games under incomplete information but caution that such games require 
more structure in specific situations. In their concluding remarks, they note that “… there 
are a variety of interesting psychological phenomena waiting to be analytically explored.” 
In this paper, I examine a specific and interesting dynamic psychological game under 
incomplete information.  
In the next section, I present a dynamic psychological game model of social 
interactions under incomplete information. I discuss applications in section 3. I conclude 
the paper in section 4. 
 
2. A Dynamic Psychological Game of Social Interaction 
I focus on the following specific example. Consider two people, 1 and 2. Person 1 
has the option of inviting person 2 to a movie, party, dinner or any social event. If person 
2 believes that 1 genuinely wants her company, she gets a utility, v ≥ 0, if she is invited 
and attends the social event. If she does not feel wanted at the social event, she incurs a 
psychic cost of θ > 0.  It is important to note that person 1 need not show that she dislikes 
2’s company. All that is required is that person 2 believes that person 1 probably does not 
like her company but is only pretending that she (i.e., player 1) likes her company. So it 
is player 2’s inference about player 1’s intentions that matters. Therefore, the same action   5
(i.e., invitation) by player 1 could give player 2 different payoffs depending on her beliefs 
about player 1’s intentions. Note that if v > 0, person 2 would accept an invitation from 
person 1 if she did not care about 1’s intentions. 
Let v be a random variable that is commonly known to be continuously 
distributed on  ] v , v [ with density f(v) and corresponding distribution function, F(v), 
. 0 v ≥  
  Suppose that nature gives person 1 a two-dimensional type: social and guilt types. 
These types are independently drawn. If person 1 is of social type wH > 0, then she 
derives a benefit of wH from 2’s company. If she is of social type wL, then she incurs a 
cost of wL > 0, when she is in 2’s company. Let the probability distribution of these types 
be such that Pr(wH) = p and Pr(wL) = 1-p, p ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ . Furthermore, person 1 feels guilty, if 
she does not invite person 2. This imposes a high or low cost of guilt on her (i.e., person 
1). Let the cost be gH > gL > 0, which are distributed as follows: Pr(gH) = q and  
Pr(gL) = 1- q, q ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ . Therefore gH and gL are her guilt types. Assume that gL < wL ≤ gH. 
The players have common priors. All this information is common knowledge. However, 
person 1’s type on either dimension is her private information. 
  After observing her two-dimensional type, person 1 has two strategies: invite (I) 
or do not invite (D). Person 2 has two strategies: accept (A) or reject (R) an invitation 
from 1. The game is sequential. Player 1 is the first-mover and player 2 is the second-
mover.  
If person 1’s social type is wL, then she really does not want person 2 in her 
company. And therefore if person 2 accepted an invitation and became aware of this fact, 
her payoff will be –θ. So if person 1 invites person 2, what belief should person 2 hold   6
about person 1’s type or intention? This matters to person 2, because she wants to know 
if person 1 is inviting her because she really likes her or because she feels very guilty 
otherwise. That is, person 2 needs to know whether she is being tolerated or being 
genuinely accepted. Person 2 wants to know the motive or intention behind 1’s invitation. 
Note that player 1 does not feel guilty so long as she invites player 2, even if she 
does not want player 2 to accept her invitation. For example, if her type pair is {gL, wL}, 
she might invite player 2 and if player 2 rejects it, then she suffers no guilt. While the 
motivation for this behavior may be straightforward, it may be helpful to elaborate 
further. One explanation is that player 1 anticipates if she does not invite player 2, then 
player 2 will say things or act in a manner to make player 1 feel guilty. But if player 1 
invites her and she rejects it, then player 2 lacks the moral basis to make player 1 feel 
guilty or player 1 can justify her behavior on the basis that she invited player 2 after all. 
Of course, player 1’s guilt need not depend on player 2’s words or actions.  
In this game, player 1 will have to form beliefs about whether player 2 will accept 
or reject her offer and player 2 will have to form beliefs about player 1’s beliefs or 
intentions (i.e., second-order beliefs). This gives a psychological game in the sense of  
Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and Rabin (1993). Player 2 will now have to interpret an 
invitation under the following possible scenarios: Is player 1 inviting her because (i) her 
social type is wH, or (ii) her type pair is {wL, gH}, or (iii) her type pair is {wL, gL} but has 
nevertheless invited her, hoping that she will reject it and not feel guilty as a result? 
 
 
   7
 
 
2.1 Solving the psychological game 
I look for a psychological equilibrium to this game.
2 Note that if player 1 plays D, 
then player 2 does not have to respond. So the analysis is restricted to player 2’s response 
when player 1 plays I. 
Let  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ σ  be the probability that player 2 rejects an invitation from player 1 
and let  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ σ′  be player 1’s expectation of σ. Let  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ σ′ ′  be player 2’s expectation 
(second-order beliefs) of σ′.
3 
Notice that if v is sufficiently small and θ is sufficiently large, then given that 
σ′ ′ ∈ [0,1], player 2 will reject an invitation from player 1. In what follows, I do not 
focus on such extreme conditions unless otherwise stated. 
In this psychological game, player 1’s optimal strategy is as follows: (i) if her 
social type is wH, she will invite player 2; (ii) If her type pair is {wL, gH}, she will invite 
player 2; and (iii) if her type pair is {wL, gL} and -(1-σ′)wL = -gL (i.e., σ′= 1 – gL/wL), 
then she is indifferent between inviting player 2 and not inviting her.
 4 So if her type pair 
is {gL, wL}, then it is an equilibrium response to invite player 2 with probabilityσ′. 
 Note  that  since  gH ≥ wL, it follows that gH > (1-σ′)wL necessarily holds since 
σ′∈[0,1]. So if player 1’s type pair is {gH, wL}, she will invite player 2, regardless of 
player 2’s rejection probability. Hence the strategy in case (ii) is optimal. The only 
                                                 
2 Kolpin (1992) argues that traditional game theory can handle psychological games by allowing players to 
choose their beliefs. However, to the best of my knowledge, this approach has not been adopted in the 
literature. In non-game theoretic settings, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) 
allow agents to choose their beliefs. 
3 As in Rabin (1993), Ruffle (1999) and Dufwenberg (2002), I do not consider beliefs beyond second-order 
beliefs. 
4 I assume that this condition holds in equilibrium.  I shall relax it shortly.   8
scenario in which player 2’s rejection probability could possibly influence player 1’s 
invitation decision occurs when player 1’s guilt type is gL.
5 Therefore, to make the 
analysis interesting, I assume that Pr(gL) = 1 – q > 0 (i.e., q < 1).  
I first construct an equilibrium such that σ′= 1 – gL/wL. I shall relax this 
restriction shortly. 
Given player 1’s strategy, player 2 computes the posterior probability 
p ) p 1 ]( ) q 1 ( q [
) p 1 ]( ) q 1 ( q [
) w Pr( ) w I (
) w Pr( ) w I (
) I w (
H , L i
i i
L L
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  Then player 2 rejects an invitation from player 1 if  
0 ) I w ( v ) I w ( ) I A ( U L H < θ ρ − ρ =        (1) 
  Since the posterior probabilities depend onσ′ ′ , it follows that player 2’s payoff in 
equation (1) depends directly onσ′ ′ . This is not the case in standard game theory and it is 
in this sense that this game is a psychological game.
6  Note also that while Geanakoplos 
et al. (1989), Rabin (1993), Ruffle (1999) and Dufwenberg (2002)  incorporate beliefs 
directly into the utility function, the dependence of player 2’s payoff on beliefs arises 
naturally in my model via Bayesian updating. Also, player 1’s payoff depends on σ′.  
Given the condition in (1), player 2 of type 
) I w (
) I w (





= σ′ ′  is indifferent 
between accepting or rejecting an invitation. It follows that   
                                                 
5 Of course, her social type must be wL as well. 
6 See, for example, the payoffs in Geanakoplos et al. (1989), Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg (2002).   9
)) ( v ˆ ( F dv ) v ( f
) ( v ˆ
v
σ′ ′ = = σ ∫
σ′ ′
,          ( 2 )  
  As in Geanakoplos et al. (1989), Rabin (1993), and the other papers cited above, 
mutual consistency of beliefs requires that  σ = σ′ = σ′ ′ .
7  Given that  )) ( v ˆ ( F σ′ ′ is a 
continuous function of σ′ ′  mapping the unit interval [0,1] onto itself, it follows from 
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem that there is, at least, one solution (a fixed point) to (2). 
Unless otherwise indicated, I assume that the solution is unique. Call it σ*. This gives the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1:  In the psychological social interaction game, there exists a   
psychological equilibrium in which player 1 always  invites player 2  if  her social type is  
wH  or  if  her type pair is  {wL, gH}. If her type pair is {wL, gL} and σ* =1 - gL/wL, then 
she invites player 2 with probability σ*. Player 2 rejects player 1’s invitation with 
probability σ*. 
  As an example, suppose v is uniformly distributed on [0,1], then we obtain the 
unique solution 
) p 1 )( q 1 ( p
) p 1 ( q
*
− − θ −
− θ
= σ .            ( 3 )  
To ensure that σ* ≤ 1, we require θ ≤ p/(1 – p). This is because if θ is sufficiently high, 
the condition   1 v v ˆ = ≤  is violated. Since θ > 0, θ ≤ p/(1 – p) requires p > 0. However, 
for p = 0, it is easy to see that the equilibrium rejection probability is σ* = 1. If it is 
                                                 
7 Notice that simultaneously imposing this restriction and  σ′= 1 – gL/wL makes  σ′overdetermined. Later, I 
shall elaborate on this and construct an equilibrium that satisfies mutual consistency of beliefs but does not 
have this property.     10
certain that player 1 dislikes player 2 (i.e., Pr(wL) = 1), then  player 2 should reject any 
invitation from player 1. 
  Proposition 1 gives an equilibrium of the psychological game but the two 
restrictions (a) (1- σ*)wL = gL and (b) mutual consistency of beliefs, resulted in an 
overdetermined system of equations. In what follows, I construct an equilibrium which 
does not have this property.  
Given equation (3), it follows that σ* = 0, when q = 0. This result implies that if 
player 1’s guilt type is always gL (i.e., q = 0) and her social type is wL, then she never 
invites player 2, since player 2 never rejects an invitation in this psychological 
equilibrium. Therefore, player 1 invites player 2 with probability Pr(wH) = p > 0 (i.e., 
when she draws wH). In this case, beliefs are consistent and this is indeed an equilibrium 
given gL < wL ≤ gH. I summarize this analysis in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2:  Suppose v is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and q = 0. Then there exists a  
pure-strategy psychological equilibrium in which (i)  player 1 always  invites player 2,  if  
her social  type is  wH,  and (ii) player 1 never  invites player 2, if  her social type is  wL. 
Player 2 always accepts player 1’s invitation (i.e., σ* = 0). In this equilibrium player 1 
invites player 2 with probability, Pr(wH) = p > 0. 
Suppose we relax the requirement of mutual consistency of beliefs such that  
σ′ ′ =  σ but σ′need not to be equal toσ′ ′ . Therefore player 2’s belief of σ′ need not be 
correct, since we no longer require σ′ ′ = σ′. Recent models of games without mutual 
consistency of beliefs can be found in Crawford (2003), Camerer et al. (2004), and Eyster 
and Rabin (2005). In these games, players choose best-response strategies given false or 
inconsistent beliefs. Such behavior may stem from bounded rationality on the part of   11
players.
8  It is therefore not unreasonable to relax the requirement of mutual consistency 
of beliefs.  
Notice that by relaxing the requirement of mutual consistency of beliefs, the issue 
of an overdetermined system of equations does not arise. In particular, it is an equilibrium 
for player 2 to reject player 1’s invitation with probability σ* and for player 1 to (a) invite 
player 2, if her type pair is {wL, gL} and gL > (1- σ*)wL, and (b) not to invite player 2, if 
her type pair is {wL, gL} and gL ≤ (1- σ*)wL. In this equilibrium, player 1 has consistent 
beliefs but player 2 does not. 
The problem posed by consistency of beliefs in our psychological game may 
reflect Battigalli and Dufwenberg’s (2005, p. 34) warning that “[P]sychological 
sequential equilibrium requires more care because the extension of the definition of 
consistency to games of incomplete information is not obvious.” 
Given the lack of mutual consistency of beliefs and using equation (3) gives 
∂σ*/∂p < 0, ∂σ*/∂q > 0 and ∂σ*/∂θ > 0.  
 
3. Discussion and Applications 
If  p is positive but very small, the equilibrium in proposition 2 may appear to a 
third party as though player 2 is overly eager to socialize with player 1 but player 1 is not 
that eager to socialize with player 2. However, there is a more complicated social 
interaction at play. The only way that player 2 can deter player 1 from inviting her with 
the intention of assuaging her guilt is to appear to overly want to be in player 1’s 
company. That way, if player 1 invites her, she (i.e., player 2) has a higher posterior 
                                                 
8 Indeed, this is the justification in these papers for the lack of mutual consistency of beliefs.    12
belief that she must have indeed drawn wH. Notice that  ) I w ( H ρ  is decreasing in σ′ ′ = σ*. 
Since player 1 has the incentive to invite her in the psychological game, even if her social 
type is wL, player 2 accepts every invitation from player 1 when q = 0 in order to 
discourage insincere invitations. 
Note that ∂σ*/∂p < 0 and ∂σ*/∂q > 0 mean that player 2’s rejection of 1’s 
invitation is higher when p is lower or when q is higher. This suggests that two societies 
may have similar levels of social exclusion for different reasons. In one society, this may 
be due to the fact that different groups do not like each other (i.e., very low p) and in the 
other society, the groups may like each other (i.e., very high p) but are unable to 
communicate this fact due to a very high q.
9  
Furthermore, suppose σ* is not unique. Then two similar societies (i.e., the same 
p, q, θ, and f(v) function) could have different levels of social exclusion (i.e., different 
σ*). The possibility of multiple equilibria is well known in models of social interaction 
like those in Schelling (1978), Bernheim (1994) and Linbeck et al. (1999). The different 
equilibria are driven by the beliefs of agents. However, these beliefs are not explicitly 
modeled as functions of the agent’s payoffs.
10 In these models, it is only the actions of 
players which affect payoffs. The same actions by agents cannot induce different payoffs. 
Hence they are standard game-theoretic models of social interaction. The kind of social 
interaction in this paper is different because it is a psychological social interaction game 
in the sense that beliefs about intentions explicitly affect payoffs. 
                                                 
9 In this example, one might think of the inviters as a dominant group and the invitees as a minority group. 
10 Bernheim (1994) is an exception since a player’s payoff is a function of the beliefs of other players about 
her actions. Unlike the case in this paper, a player’s payoff is not a function of her own beliefs about other 
players’ beliefs.  Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) argue that the model in Bernheim (1994) can be re-
interpreted, subject to some modifications, as a psychological game with incomplete information.   13
Loury (1994, p. 435) defines a regime of political correctness as “… an 
equilibrium pattern of expression and inference within a given community where 
receivers impute undesirable qualities to senders who express themselves in an 
“incorrect” way and, as a result, senders avoid such expressions.” To the extent that 
politically-correct language is employed to accommodate those that one does not like or 
cannot identify with, the strategy by player 1 (the sender) of inviting player 2 (the 
receiver) when her type pair is {wL, gH} is consistent with political correctness. Indeed, 
political correctness can sensitize people and increase the probability, q, that they will be 
high-guilt types. However, it may have the disadvantage that people are more likely to be 
suspicious of each other’s intentions and hence a decrease in social interactions akin to 
the higher likelihood of rejections obtained above as q increases. A politically-correct 
equilibrium could be viewed as one in which some wL types mimick wH types. Of course, 
in this equilibrium there will still be a few people who will deviate from the politically-
correct equilibrium. This will be the group of senders with the type pair {wL, gL} who 
constitute a small proportion, (1-p)(1-q), if q is very close to 1.
11 
So is political correctness a bad thing if it causes people to be suspicious of the 
intentions of others? Not necessarily. One thing missing from the model is that person 2 
does not derive any disutility from not being invited (i.e., from being rejected). If she did, 
then we could argue that she derives utility from the mere act of being invited even if she 
intends to reject the offer. Therefore, political correctness need not be a bad thing if 
people derive utility from politically correct language per se. For example, people may 
derive utility from others restraining their use of racial slurs or derogatory language, even 
                                                 
11 The result that people with sufficiently extreme preferences will deviate from social norms is obtained in 
Bernheim (1994).   14
if they know that these people harbor such thoughts. If they do not value political 
correctness per se, then it could be welfare reducing. 
Notice that the condition in equation (1) holds when θ is sufficiently high. A very 
high θ may be the characteristic of a person with a very high sense of identity or self-
image, which is consistent with why she may derive a high disutility from associating 
with people who really don’t like her. Associating with people who really do not like her 
imposes a cost on her similar to the cost stemming from a loss of identity in Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000).
12 If so, the rejection of 1’s invitation when θ is very high may be 2’s way 
of choosing her identity by choosing who to associate with, in the sense of Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000). Consistent with Akerlof and Kranton (2000), my model will predict that 
women may reject attempts to entice them to traditionally male professions, if they 
believe that they will only be tolerated but not truly accepted. A difference between my 
explanation and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is that identity is an observable 
characteristic while intention is not. Intention can be inferred but not necessarily 
observed. 
The analysis may also explain why a high-ability person may decide to reject a 
job offer, if she believes that affirmative action influenced the decision.
13 Of course, this 
effect is more likely to kick in, if the person has equally-attractive or better outside 
options, which she believes were not influenced by affirmative action.
14 If high-ability 
                                                 
12 For recent economic models of identity, see Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2005) and Fang and Loury 
(2005). 
13An article in the New York Times reported that a young and talented Harvard professor claimed that s/he 
would leave Harvard, if s/he found out that s/he was hired based on affirmative action. While this may not 
necessarily be credible, it is nevertheless further testimony of the fact that the intentions behind actions 
affect people’s payoffs. 
14 Notice also that if all that the person cared about was actions not intentions, then it may be optimal to 
accept a job from a high-guilt employer in order to exploit their guilt for material gain (e.g., future higher 
salary).   15
people are very proud people with a high sense of identity and self confidence then, as 
argued in the preceding paragraph, they will tend to have a high θ and would not like to 
associate with people who do not really like them. 
As noted in the introduction, Dufwenberg (2002) studies how guilt can sustain 
investments in marriage. Without feelings of guilt, a husband could leave a marriage (i.e., 
divorce) after his wife has supported him in acquiring a lucrative professional training. 
Mindful of this, the wife will not support her husband and the mutually beneficial 
professional investment will not take place. Dufwenberg (2002) then modifies the model 
by assuming that the stronger the husband expects that his wife trusts him to stay, the 
more disutility of guilt he suffers by choosing to divorce. Using psychological game 
theory, he shows that the husband’s belief about the wife’s belief could sustain mutually 
profitable investments in the marriage. However, Dufwenberg (2002) admits that this 
explanation cannot account for why some marriages end in divorce after investments 
have taken place. To be sure, there are several reasons why marriages end in divorce and 
a single model cannot take account of all these reasons. Dufwenberg (2002) notes that 
incomplete information may be a reason. This is consistent with the simple model in this 
paper.  Incomplete information coupled with the fact that a spouse may derive enormous 
disutility from realizing that he or she is only being tolerated may lead to a divorce even 
after investments have taken place. To see this, suppose a man draws gH and wL and 
invites a woman into a marital and investment relationship, after dating for some time. 
Then the woman will accept the invitation, if  0 ) I w ( v ) I w ( L H ≥ θ ρ − ρ . But the marriage 
may later end in divorce, when it becomes common knowledge that the husband’s type is   16
wL. So a high feeling of guilt may initially sustain a marriage and subsequent investments 
in it but eventually it may not be enough to hold it together. 
The analysis has been based on the assumption that player 1 incurs no cost if her 
invitation is rejected. It is conceivable that if her social type is wH, she might find a 
rejection embarrassing. The absence of this cost explains why if player 1’s social type is 
wH, she always invites player 2. However, we sometimes do not invite certain people into 
closer relationships not because we do not like them. On the contrary, we like them but 
we are not sure if it is appropriate to invite them. By keeping the relationship at the 
original lower level, we do not rock the boat. Indeed, a rejection can even push the 
relationship to a much lower level. For example, imagine how telling a friend that you are 
romantically interested in them could damage a hitherto platonic and exciting friendship 
if your proposal is rejected. 
While including this cost of rejection or embarrassment to player 1 might alter 
some of the results, it will not change the equilibrium in proposition 2. Note that 
including the cost of rejection to player 1 will induce player 2 to moderate her rejection 
rate in order to encourage player 1 to invite her if player 1’s social type is wH. But in 
proposition 2, player 2’s rejection rate is at the minimum anyway; it is zero even without 
this cost. Since there is no rejection by player 2 in this equilibrium, player 1 would not 
worry about her offer being rejected. 
   
 
 
   17
4. Conclusion 
  I have presented a very simple game of intentions in social interactions in which 
one player (the inviter) can invite another player (the invitee) into a social relationship. 
The invitee, who cares about the intentions of inviter, can accept or reject the invitation.  
This psychological game gave rise to a complex social interaction. In particular, 
invitee may stick to a strategy of accepting every invitation with the goal of discouraging 
insincere invitations. This may lead one to erroneously infer that this player is eagerly 
waiting for an invitation from the inviter, when indeed his behavior is driven more by 
strategic considerations than by an excessive desire for social acceptance. 
Unlike the papers noted above, where beliefs directly enter the utility function, the 
dependence of players’ payoffs on beliefs arose naturally in my model via Bayesian 
updating. My main contribution lies in the type of social interactions examined and the 
applications discussed which differ from those in the papers noted above. This is also one 
of the first papers to examine a dynamic psychological game under incomplete 
information.  
The literature on psychological games is small. This partly stems from the fact 
that psychological games are more difficult to analyze than standard games. However, the 
tools of psychological game theory allow us to study certain important social phenomena 
like the nature of reciprocity as in Rabin (1993), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and 
multiplicity of other phenomena discussed in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005). I have 
presented another important social phenomenon which appears to lend itself easily to the 
tools of psychological game theory. This social interaction is interesting and common. To 
re-iterate, it is the basis of friendships and relationships at work, school, and in our daily   18
lives. It determines how often we go to lunch with someone, talk to them over the phone, 
invite them for dinner, play with them, sleep with them, and in general socialize with 
them. It determines the frequency with which people invite us into their lives and the 
corresponding frequency with which we accept those invitations. It could also determine 
how genuine people think our gratitude is, when we express it. I hope that future work 
will extend the analysis of the effect of intentions on this type of social interaction. For 




                                                 
15 I thank Zane Spindler for this observation.   19
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